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AN INFORMER'S TALE: ITS USE IN JUDICIAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
AN informer is one who voluntarily reports law violations or misconduct
to an agent or official of the government.' Informers' communications cover
a wide variety of subjects. They most repeatedly involve liquor and narcotics
law violations, larceny, vice, and illegal gambling.2 Reports of government
employees' "disloyalty" and of antitrust and wage-hour law violations are also
frequent. 3 Communications from informers are received with varying fre-
quency from four principal sources. Ordinary private citizens are the most
prolific source.4 Less commonly information is received from one who has
participated in a crime and subsequently turned against his partners.6 And
occasionally information is received from a "plant" employed by a law en-
forcement agency to participate in the commission of a crime,0 or from one
who seeks evidence of a crime with the approval or upon the urging of
governmental authorities. 7
1. Definitions of informers, narrower than the one chosen here, have been attempted.
E.g., Bryant v. Skillman Hardware Co., 76 N.J.L. 45, 46, 69 Atl. 23, 24 (1908) (an in-
former is one who gives information of a crime in order to prosecute the offender);
United States v. City of Mexico, 32 Fed. 105, 106 (S.D. Fla. 1887) (one whose informa-
tion leads directly to a legal proceeding) ; Pollock v. Steam-Boat Laura, 5 Fed. 133, 141
(S.D.N.Y. 1880) (a person who lodges information with a government officer which leads
to a suit by the government itself). However, these definitions are not susceptible of
general application. When viewing the role of the informer in the entire law enforce-
ment process, the broader definition in the text is accurate.
2. Conclusion based on response to questionnaire distributed in 1953 by the YALE
LAW JOURNAL to 31 police departments in cities of 25,000 population or more, (hereinafter
cited as QUESTIONNAIRE). The following states are represented: Calif., Colo., Conn.,
Del., Fla., Ill., Ind., Iowa, Ky., La., Mich., Minn., Neb., N.J., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Texas,
Utah, Va., Wash., and Wisc. Copies of the questionnaire and replies are in Yale Law
Library. See VoLLMER, THE PoucE IN MODERN SOCIETY 47, 87, 110 (1936).
3. Disloyalty: Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally
divided court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) ; Deak v. Pace, 185 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
Antitrust: United States v. Lorain Journal Co., 10 F.R.D. 487 (N.D. Ohio 1950);
United States v. Sun Oil Co., 10 F.R.D. 448 (E.D. Pa. 1950) ; United States v. Deere
& Co., 9 F.R.D. 523 (D. Minn. 1949); United States v. Kohler Co., 9 F.R.D. 289 (E.D.
Pa. 1949).
Wage-Hour: Walling v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 4 F.R.D. 265 (E.D.N.Y.
1943) ; Fleming v. Bernardi, 1 F.R.D. 624 (N.D. Ohio 1941).
4. QUESToNNAIRE. Twenty-three police departments indicated that their most fre-
quent source of confidential information is ordinary private citizens.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid. See HOPKINS, OUR LAwI.ss POLICE 104-109 (1931).
7. QUESTIONNAIRE. See Hoover, A Comment on the Article "Loyalty Among Govern-
ment Employees", 58 YALE L.J. 401, 404 (1949).
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The informer plays an important role in the enforcement of criminal, civil,
and administrative laws. Law enforcement agencies-local, state, and national
-- carefully consider all informers' communications, and with the aid of such
reports many law infractions are exposed.8 The information received may
prompt an investigation 9 or be used as the basis of an arrest or search;10
ultimately, sufficient evidence may be gathered on which to base a successful
criminal or civil action." And it is not unusual for an informer's communi-
cation to motivate and support proceedings before an administrative agency.' 2
However, supplying information to the government may involve danger to
the informer. He may expose himself-and perhaps also his family and
friends-to physical violence, social ostracism, or legal action.' 3 Fear of these
consequences must be obviated if law enforcement authorities are to receive
the information they consider so valuable. It is not enough to say that it is
both the citizen's duty and his right to report law violations ;14 many indivi-
duals will remain reluctant to give information to the government unless they,
are assured effective protection.15 Moreover, if the informer is engaged in
counter-espionage, disclosure of his identity might endanger national security
by jeopardizing the agent's future usefulness.' 0 As a result, law enforcement
agencies frequently desire to withhold the source and contents of informers'
8. QuESTIox.NAn See Shafer v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. 558, 561, 209 S.W2d 599,
602 (1948) ; State v. Viola, 51 Ohio Law Abstract 577, 536, 82 N.E2d 306, 313 (1947).
See ELLiorr, CRIME IN MoDEx SocmwrE 490-1 (1952); Donnelly, Judicial Control of
Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agents Prin'ocateurs, 60 YAUrm LJ. 1091 (1951) ;
Comment, 22 C-AIm. L. REv. 667, 674 (1934). Cf. Statement of J. Edgar Hoover in Hear-
ings before Senate Committee on Appropriations on Supplemental Appropriations for
1951, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 740 (1950).
9. QUESTIONNAIRE. See United States v. Keown, 19 F. Supp. 639, 646 (W.D. Ky.
1937).
10. See note 9 supra; HoPKINS, Op. cit. supra note 6, at 89.
11. QUESTIONNAIRE.
12. See pp. 221-2 infra.
13. See statement by August Vollmer quoted in Comment, 22 CAL'. L. Rm. 667,
676 (1934). See also Fusco v. Moses, 304 N.Y. 424, 433, 107 N.E.Zd 581, 583 (1952);
Note, 6 So. CALi. L REv. 245, 246 (1933).
A vivid illustration of the dangers to which informers may expose themselves is the
Arnold Schuster murder case. Schuster's identification led to the arrest of bank robber
Willie Sutton. The New York police publicly disclosed that Schuster was the informant.
A few days thereafter, Schuster was mysteriously slain. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1952, p. 1,
col. 2; id., March 9, 1952, p. 1, col. 8.
14. See In re Quarles & Butler, 158 U.S. 532, 535 (1894).
15. See sources cited note 8 supra; Statement of J. Edgar Hoover in Hcarings before
Sunbcommittee of Committee on Foreign Relations on S. Res. 231, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
328 (1950). See also Trial of Thomas Hardy, 24 How. St. Tr. 199, 816 (1794). Cf.
Hoover, Civil Liberties and Law Enforcement: The Role of the F.B.., 37 IowA L. REv.
175, 193 (1952).
16. See statement of Seth Richardson, Washington Post, Dec. 28, 1947, p. 10, cols. 3-S;
BoNrEcou, THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SEcuRrIT PROGRAM 135, 246 (1953). See also Jack-
son, 3., dissenting in Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 551 (1949).
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communications in courtroom and administrative proceedings. And they have
persuaded the judiciary to devise positive policies implementing this desire.
To the extent that policies shielding informers do not impinge upon funda-
mental rights of others, they appear justified. But society has an interest in
assuring fair play to the parties involved, as well as in efficient law enforce-
ment.17 Under our system of government, sanction enforcement practices
must adjust to civil liberties; efficiency does not substitute for the demands
of justice. And while the guiding principle of fairness underlying judicial
and administrative proceedings cannot be incorporated in an immutable for-
mula, it requires at least that parties to a proceeding have full opportunity
to meet the case against them. This opportunity may be obstructed by denial
of a party's claim that knowledge of an informer's identity and a chance to
cross-examine him is essential to his case. Moreover, unfairness results where
a party is prevented from proving his case by being denied access to the con-
tents of an informer's communication. And grave injustice occurs where
the report of an unknown informant is utilized by a tribunal as evidence.
THE INFORMER IN THE COURTROOM
Facilitating the Use of Informers
Courts have developed evidentiary rules which facilitate the use of in-
formers by law enforcement agencies. To encourage the communication of
information to governmental authorities it is sometimes deemed necessary
to suppress both the identity of the informer and the contents of his report.18
Some rules have developed which serve only one of these functions ;10 others
serve both.20 Those rules which are designed to shroud the identity of in-
formers are said to benefit the government, although incidentally they ac-
commodate informers. 21 And some rules protect from revelation the contents
of an informer's communication, even after the informer's identity has been
disclosed.22 These rules are designed primarily to benefit the informer;23
they immunize him from actions for libel, slander, and malicious prosecution. "4
17. "Law enforcement, however, in defeating the criminal, must maintain inviolate
the historic liberties of the individual. To turn back the criminal, yet, by doing so, de-
stroy the dignity of the individual, would be a hollow victory." Hoover, Civil Liberties
and Law Enforcenent: The Role of the F.B.I., 37 IoWA L. REv. 175, 177 (1952). Seo
DOUGLAs, BEING AN AmEICAN 108 (1948). Cf. Holmes, J., dissenting in Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928).
18. See Sanford, Evidentiary Privileges against the Production of Data 'uithldn ili
Control of Executive Departments, 3 VANv. L. Ray. 73, 76 (1949).
19. See text at notes 39, 42 infra.
20. See text at note 29 infra.
21. See Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487, 488 (1872); Attorney General v.
Briant, 15 M. & W. 169, 170, 153 Eng. Rep. 808, 809 (1846). See Note, 17 TEXAs L. Rv.
522 (1939).
22. See notes 29, 39, 42 infra.
23. See State v. Archer, 32 N.M. 319, 334, 255 Pac. 396, 402 (1927).
24. See pp. 216-20 infra.
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The so-called informer's privilege-assertable by either the government or
the court2 -has been the informer's traditional courtroom shield.20  This
doctrine was originated by the common law to serve the public's interest in
facilitating reports of crime: it permits the government to conceal the source
of its communications..2 7 And under this rule a witness cannot be required to
reveal whether he was the government's informant.2 s
But the government--either state or federal-has not been satisfied with
suppression of identity alone; courts have been persuaded to veil in secrecy
the contents of informers' reports by distorting the informer's privilege, as
well as the state secrets, attorney-client, and official communications privi-
leges.
Some courts have extended the informer's privilege and the state secrets
privilege beyond their original scope by utilizing them to suppress the con-
tents of informers' communications. '9 Expanding the informer's privilege may
occasionally be justifiable where publication of the informer's report would
reveal his identity.30 But this practice is pursued even where the identity of
25. E.g., Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 437 (1872) (privilege assertable by the
government) ; Home v. Bentinck, 2 Brod. & B. 130, 162, 129 Eng. Rep. 90, 920 (1820)
("[I]f the parties were willing to disclose the sources of their infurmation, they V-ould nt
be suffered to do so by the judges.").
Obviously, the privilege would be valueless were the informer required to assert it,
for in doing so he would reveal his identity. It would therefore appear that "informer's
privilege" is a misnomer.
26. The informer's privilege originated in the courts of England. It was first wsed
to permit the government to conceal names of those who informed of revenue frauds. Rex
v. Akers, 6 Esp. 127, 170 Eng. Rep. 850 (1790).
With the e-xtension of the informer's privilege to treason trials, Trial of Thomas
Hardy, 24 How. St. Tr. 199 (1794) ; Rex v. Watson, 2 Stark. 115, 171 Eng. Rep. 591
(1817), the scope of inquiry was further limited. The privilege was there applied to pro-
tect the channels through which communications were conveyed to the government. Thus
a witness was not permitted to disclose either the identity of the person on whose advice
he informed or the name of the government officer to whom he gave his information.
Trial of Thomas Hardy, sutpra. This extension of the privilege was undoubtedly designed
to protect the counter-espionage activities of the government.
Finally, the policy of protecting the identity of informers was recognized in civil suits.
Home v. Bentinck, 2 Brod. & B. 130, 129 Eng. Rep. 907 (1820), was an action for libel
based on the report of a military inquiry. Since the report contained names of those who
had informed to the inquiry, it was not admitted in evidence.
27. E.g., Mitrovich v. United States, 15 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1926); United States v.
Moses, 27 Fed. Cas. 5, No. 15, 825 (E.D. Pa. 1827); State v. Fortin, 10t5 Me. 332, 76
AtL 896 (1910) ; State v. Martin, 55 S.D. 594, 227 N.W. 66 (1929).
28. Attorney General v. Briant, 15 M. & W. 169, 153 Eng. Rep. 803 (1846).
29. Informer's Privilege: E.g., Gabriel v. McMullin, 127 Iowa 426, 103 N.W. 355
(1905) ; Michael v. Matson, 81 Kan. 360, 105 Pac. 537 (1909) ; People v. Laird, 102 Mich.
135, 60 N.V. 457 (1894).
State Secrets Priilege: E.g., Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487 (1872). Cf.
King v. United States, 112 Fed. 988 (5th Cir. 1902); State v. Brown, 2 Marvel (Del.)
380, 36 AtL 458 (1896) ; Krumin v. Brulmes, 255 Ill. App. 503 (1930).
30. See People v. Laird, 102 Mich. 135, 60 N.W. 457 (1894).
1953]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the informant is already known.31 And frequently an informer's report is
classified as a state secret.32 Traditionally, the state secrets privilege, 3 ap-
plicable during peace as well as war,34 was limited to protecting military
secrets,30 information essential to national security, 0 and intelligence bearing
on the nation's international relations.37 But courts have often classified in-
formers' reports of ordinary law violations among the secrets of state.
38
In eleven states, statutes protecting "official communications" afford an
additional basis for judicial shielding of informers' communications.3 0 Such
laws provide that the contents of reports made to public officials in "official
confidence" are privileged from revelation where the "public interest would
suffer by disclosure. ' 40 While the scope of these enactments has never been
precisely defined, they were designed to encourage communications concern-
ing both law violations and other matters of special interest to state govern-
ments.
41
Finally, upon facts deemed appropriate some courts justify withholding an
31. Michael v. Matson, 81 Kan. 360, 105 Pac. 537 (1909). Cf. Dellastatious v. Boyce,
152 Va. 368, 147 S.E. 267 (1929). Contra: Nola Electric v. Reilly, 11 F.R.D. 103 (S.D.
N.Y. 1950). But the informer's privilege is not applicable where both the identity of the
informer and the contents of his communication are known. Pihl v. Morris, 319 Mass. 577,
66 N.E.2d 804 (1946).
32. See note 29 .spra.
33. See, generally, 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2378 (3d ed. 1940) ; A.L.I. MODEL CoDE
OF EVIDENCE, Rule 227; Street, State Secrets-A Comparative Study, 14 MoD. L. REv.
121 (1951).
34. See Pollen v. Ford Instr. Co., 26 F. Supp. 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
35. See Bank Line, Ltd. v. United States, .163 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1947) (report of
Naval Board of Inquiry) ; Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 Fed. 353
(E.D. Pa. 1912) (drawings of armor-piercing projectiles) ; In re Grove, 180 Fed. 62 (3d
Cir. 1910) (plans of submarine turbine propelling machinery).
36. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875) (contract for secret war ser-
vices) ; United States v. Haugen, 58 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Wash. 1944) (contract relating
to secret War Department project) ; Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624 (re-
port of submarine sinking). Cf. Cresmer v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1949).
37. See Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624, 642; O'Neill v. United
States, 79 F. Supp. 827, 829 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
38. See note 29 supra.
39. CA. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1881(5) (Deering, 1953); IDAHo CODE ANN. § 9-203
(1948); IowA CODE ANN. §622.11 (1950); MINN. STAT. ANN. §595.02(5) (1947);
MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 93-701-4(5) (1949); Nm. REv. STAT. § 25-1208 (1948); NEV.
ComP. LAWs ANN. § 8975 (1930) ; N.D. Rlv. CODE § 31-0106 (1944) ; OiMx. ComP. LAWS
ANN. §3-104(5) (1940); S.D. CODE §36.0101(5) (1939); WASH. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 1214(5) (Remington, 1932). Georgia has a similar statute. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-1102
(1937).
40. For example, the Oregon statute states: "A public officer shall not be examined
as to communications made to him in official confidence when the public interest would
suffer by the disclosure." Oma. Comp. LAws ANN. § 3-104(5) (1940).
41. See Sanford, supra note 18, at 82.
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informer's communication by advancing the attorney-client privilege."- This
privilege forbids an attorney to disclose any communication made to him by
a client in the course of consultation. 43 It has been utilized to prevent a prose-
cuting attorney from revealing what was told to him by an informer.4" And
while this rationale would not be available where the informant communicated
with a police officer who was not an attorney, reports to Federal Bureau of
Investigation agents, most of whom are lawyers,4 5 might be protected.4 0
Assuring Fair Play to Parties
Generally, withholding the identity of an informer poses no problems to a
defendant. If the informer has merely provided a lead to competent evidence
of a crime, kmowledge of his identity would satisfy curiosity but ordinarily
would not aid a party in the making of his case. "4 7 But in some situations a
defendant will need to know the name of an informer to meet the case against
him. This may occur both where the informant supplied a "tip" and where
his communication is introduced in evidence. And the law does not provide
unlimited protection to the identity of informers. Where suppression of an
42. E.g., Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311 (18I4); Oliver v. Pate, 43 Ind. 132 (1873);
Gabriel v. Mc,lullin, 127 Iowa 426, 103 N.W'. 355 (1905); Lewis v. Roux Trucking Corp.,
222 App. Div. 204, 226 N.Y. Supp. 70 (3d Dep't 197) ; Ratzlaff v. State, 122 Olda. 2,3,
249 Pac. 934 (1926). Contra: Vernon v. State, 49 Ga. App. 187, 174 S.E. 543 (1934);
Granger v. Warrington, 3 Ill. 299 (1846) ; Cole v. Andrews, 74 Minn. 93, 76 N.W. 962
(1898); Centoamore v. State, 105 Neb. 452, 181 N.W. 182 (1920); Cobb v. Simon, 119
Wisc. 597 (1903).
43. See 8 ,vIGORE_, EVIDENCE § 2291 (3d ed. 1940) ; Radin, The Prhilege of Con-
fidential Commmnication Between La.'ver and Client, 16 CALI. L REV. 487 (19M).
44. E.g., Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311 (1884) ; Lewis v. Roux Trucking Corp., 222
App. Div. 204, 226 N.Y. Supp. 70 (3d Dep't 1927).
45. See Hoover, The Civil Investigation of the F.B.I., 1 SYnAcusE I. RM. 380, 3M2
(1950).
46. The Government has already argued that FBI reports should be privileged from
discovery as "work products" of lawyers. United States v. Cotton Valley Operators
Comm., 9 F.R.D. 719 (W.D. La. 1949), aff'd by an equally dividcd court, 339 U.S. 940
(1950). See the discussion of this case in Taine, Discovery of Trial Preparations in the
Federal Courts, 50 CoL L. REv. 1026, 1044 n.103 (1950). See also O'Neill v. United
States, 79 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Pa. 1948). Cf. Altmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971
(3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 967 (1950). While the courts have usually rejected
this argument, they have included communications to other government attorneys carry-
ing on investigations within the "work product" doctrine. United States v. Deere, 9
F.R.D. 523 (D. MIinn. 1949). An argument could be made that communications betv-een
FBI agents and informers fall within the attorney-client privilege.
47. "[T]he information... obtained by the police furnished only the impulse for the
act-the watch and search. The information itself was not used as evidence of guilt, and
the fact of guilt itself is really not denied. ... To have required, under these circumstances,
that the name of the informant should be disclosed, would merely have gratified his curi-
osity or his vengeance, whichever was most involved, without affecting in any way the
pending question before the court." Shore v. United States, 49 F2d 519, 523 (D.C Cir.
1931). Cf. United States v. Keow:rn, 19 F. Supp. 639, 646 (W.D. Ky. 1937).
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informer's identity would prevent a party to an action from making out his
case, courts have deferred to federal and state constitutional safeguards.
Most frequently it is where the government undertakes a criminal prosecu-
tion that revelation of an informer's identity is desired. And the accused has
at his command the Sixth Amendment and analogous state provisions,
48
guaranteeing to him the "right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him."'49 The requirement of confrontation is a codification of the common
law hearsay rule, which prohibits introduction of an unproduced witness'
testimony ro and reserves to the accused a right of cross-examination.
1 This
constitutional command protects an accused where the contents of an in-
48. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him. .. ." UNITED STATES CONST. AMEND. VI. For a general discussion of the history and
scope of the Sixth Amendment, see HELLER, THE SixTH AMENDMENT TO THE CoNsrIU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES (1951).
49. While it has been held that the Sixth Amendment is not applicable to state court
proceedings, West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904), forty-six states have constitutional
or statutory provisions requiring that the accused shall be "confronted with the witnesses
against him" or "brought face to face" with them. 5 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1397 (3d ed.
1940). And the Supreme Court has suggested that the right of confrontation may be a
part of the Fourteenth Amendment. "A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge
against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense-a right to his day in court-
are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a right
to examine the witnesses against him ...." I re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
The Sixth Amendment is applicable only to a "criminal prosecution." United States
v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475 (1896). Thus it has been held that the Sixth Amendment does not
apply to extradition proceedings, Ex parte La Mantia, 206 Fed. 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1913), to
a preliminary hearing, Burall v. Johnston, 53 F. Supp. 126 (N.D. Calif. 1943), to grand
jury proceedings, Gilmore v. United States, 129 F.2d 199 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 631 (1942), or to habeas corpus proceedings, Burgess v. King, 130 F.2d 761 (8th Cir.
1942). For a further discussion of the scope of the Sixth Amendment, see Note, 60 YALE
L.J. 736, 738 (1951).
50. "The origin of this requirement of confrontation grew out of and is part of the
hearsay rule, which is defined as the rule which prohibits the use of a person's assertion
as equivalent to testimony to the fact asserted, unless the asserter is brought to testify in
court on the stand, where he may be probed and cross-examined as to the grounds of hIs
assertion and his qualifications to make it." Williams v. State, 42 Okla. Crim. 399, 403,
276 Pac. 515, 516 (1929). See also Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548 (1926);
HELLR, op. cit. supra note 48, at 104.
The hearsay rule's exceptions are also part of the Sixth Amendment. Dowdell v.
United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911); Note, 28 N.C.L. REV. 205, 207 (1950). See also 5
WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1397 (3d ed. 1940).
For a detailed discussion of the hearsay rule, see 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940);
Morgan, Te Hearsay Rule, 12 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1937).
51. "The constitutional right of confrontation is preliminary to and but another name
for the right of cross-examination." State v. Crooker, 123 Me. 310, 313, 122 AtI. 865, 866
(1923). See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895) (stressing also the value
of demeanor evidence). See also State v. Perry, 210 N.C. 796, 188 S.E. 639 (1936);
RoTrSCHAeFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 796 (1939) ; Note, 28 N.C.L. REV. 205, 207 (1950).
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former's communication are openly introduced in evidence but his identity is
withheld.5
2
An accused may also derive protection from the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments' due process requirements.53 Even where the informer's com-
munication is not considered by the court and is not introduced in evidence,
disclosure of the informer's identity may be commanded. Courts vill compel
revelation of informers' identity where such disclosure is necessary or likely
to show the innocence of the defendant rl or is in some other way essential
to the defense,5 or where it will lessen the risk of false testimonyP And
disclosure is also demanded where the informer is not a "mere informer," but
instead a person who took part in the conduct relied upon by the govern-
ment to prove its case.
57
52. "This provision of the statute [a provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights similar
to the Sixth Amendment] intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as
facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face
at the trial, who give their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an o.por-
tunity of cross-examination. It was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upn
depositions or ex parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to
test the recollection of the witness. . . ." Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330
(1911). See also Williams v. State, 19 Ga. 402, 403 (1856); Hr.nTim, op. cit. Mspra note
48, at 105.
However, where an informer's communication is used simply as a lead to a law vio-
lation, concealing his identity does not violate the Sixth Amendment. Dear Check Quong
v. United States, 160 F.2d 251 (D.C. Cir. 1947). Cf. Curtis v. Rives, 123 F.24 935 (D.C.
Cir. 1941). In such a case, nothing the informer has said or done constitutes part of the
evidence relied on by the government in its case. The informer served only as a stimulus;
so stimulated, the law enforcement agency proceeds to erect its case.
53. Parsons v. State, 251 Ala. 467, 38 So.2d 209 (1943).
The Fifth Amendment provides: "No person shall . . .in any criminal case ...he
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . ." Uzrrn SrATs
CON ST. AM5END. V.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides: "... nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. .. ." Uzzrm STATES Co:-sr. A=I.xD.
XIV.
hile the Fifth Amendment places restrictions on the powers of the national Govern-
ment, Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 242 (U.S. 1833), the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
certain kinds of action by a state, Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
54. See United States v. Li Fat Tong, 152 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1945); Smith v.
United States, 9 F.2d 386, 387 (9th Cir. 1925) ; Parsons v. State, 251 Ala. 467, 473, 38
So.2d 209, 213 (1948). See also Regina v. Richardson, 3 F. & F. 693, 694, 176 Eng. Rep.
318, 319 (1863) ; Marks v. Beyfus, 25 Q.B.D. 494, 498 (1890) ("[I]f upon the trial of a
prisoner the judge should be of the opinion that the disclosure of the name of the infor-
mant is necessary or right in order to shew the prisoner's innocence, then one public policy
is in conflict with another public policy, and that which says that an innocent man is not
to be condemned when his innocence can be proved is the policy that must pre'ail").
55. See Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 (1938) ; Sorrentino v. United States,
163 F.2d 627, 629 (9th Cir. 1947).
56. Wilson v. United States, 59 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1932).
57. United States v. Conforti, 200 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1952). Cf. United States v.
Schneiderman, 104 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. Calif. 1952).
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Finally, court rules motivated by constitutional provisions proscribing tn-
reasonable searches, seizures, and arrests may preserve an accused's right to
fair trial. 58 Where a search and seizure or arrest-with or without warrant-
was based solely on an informer's statement, the prosecution must reveal the
identity of the informant upon whose credibility depends existence of the
probable cause requisite to lawful police action." Only by knowing the in-
formant's identity can the accused attack his reliability, thus permitting the
58. The Fourth Amendment provides: "The -right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation. . . ." UNITED STATES CONST. AmEND. IV. The constitution of every state
contains a clause like that of the Fourth Amendment, and often in its precise words. For
a collection of the state provisions, see Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145, 160 (1947).
The Fourth Amendment "does not forbid all searches and seizures, but only those that
are unlawful because not based upon probable cause or upon a warrant where a warrant
is required." Cannon v. United States, 158 F.2d 952, 954 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 330 U.S.
839 (1947). To enforce the Fourth Amendment's provisions, federal courts have adopted
an "exclusionary rule"; evidence illegally obtained is excluded from the prosecution's case.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) ; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
Nineteen states have adopted a similar rule. See Comment, 58 YAt. L.JE. 144, 150 n.31
(1948). See also Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures, 25 CoL L. REv. 11 (1925) ; Harno, Evidence Obtained by Illegal
Search and Seizure, 19 ILL. L. REV. 303 (1925) ; Edwards, Standing to Suppress Unrea-
sonably Seized Evidence, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 471 (1952).
59. Search and Seizure Without a Warrant: Wilson v. United States, 59 F.2d 390
(3d Cir. 1932); United States v. Keown, 19 F. Supp. 639 (W.D. Ky. 1937); Hamilton v.
State, 149 Miss. 251, 115 So. 427 (1928). Contra: Goetz v. United States, 39 F.2d 903
(5th Cir. 1930).
Search and Seizure With a Warrant: United States v. Reynolds, 111 F. Supp. 589
(D.D.C. 1953).
Arrest Without a Warrant: Smith v. State, 169 Tenn. 633, 90 S.W.2d 523 (1936). Cf.
McQuaid v. United States, 198 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1952) ; United States v. Heitner, 149
F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1945).
Some cases have refused disclosure where there was sufficient evidence of probable
cause without revelation of the informer's identity. Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251
(1938) ; United States v. Bianco, 189 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1951) ; Harris v. State, - Miss.-,
63 So.2d 396 (1953).
While disclosure of an informer's identity may be necessary in order to test probable
cause as required by the Fourth Amendment, the defendant's right to demand such dis-
closure is based on due process. This is another situation where "if what is asked is use-
ful evidence to vindicate the innocence of the accused or lessen the risk of false testimony
or is essential to the proper disposition of the case, disclosure will be compelled." Wilson
v. United States, 59 F.2d 390, 392 (3d Cir. 1932), 46 HARV. L. R'v. 343. Thus where the
defendant does not allege that knowledge of the informer's identity is essential to his de-
fense or that he believes that the police officer is testifying falsely, disclosure may not be
required. Medina v. United States, 158 F.2d 955 (5th Cir. 1946) ; MeInes v. United States,
62 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1932) ; Shore v. United States, 49 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1931). Cf.
Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
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court to determine the probable cause issuecO If it appears that the search
and seizure or arrest was conducted without probable cause, evidence so
obtained will be inadmissible in court 01 and the arrest will be unlawful.
Defendants may also desire to learn the identity of informers in the course
of civil prosecutions undertaken by the government.es Although the Govern-
ment has been permitted to withhold the names of complainants in antitrust
and wage-hour cases,6 the defendant's right to fair trial is generally safe-
guarded. Frequently the defendant is able to secure disclosure of the infor-
mant's identity on the theory that by bringing suit the Government has waived
its right to suppress relevant material.0 5 But even if the waiver doctrine were
not applied, the defendant would probably be protected from the introduction
of testimony of an unknown witness."0
Moreover, constitutional weapons are available to combat the government's
attempt, under whatever rationale, to wvithhold the contents of an informer's
communication. In criminal cases, the accused again receives his greatest
protection from the Sixth Amendment. 6 7 This Amendment's command that
"in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right.., to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him" guarantees
the defendant an opportunity to rebut the charges against him.0 3 Accordingly,
a court or jury cannot base its decision on an informer's communication un-
60. See, e.g., Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (193S); United States v. Heitner,
149 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1945) ; United States v. Blich, 45 F.2d 627 (D. Wyo. 1930), 22
J. CmR-. L. & CRIIOLOGY 284 (1931) ; Smith v. State, 169 Tean. 633, 90 S..2d 523
(1936).
61. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886) ; United States v. Allen, 16 F.2d 320 (S.D. Fla. 1926).
62. E.g., United States v. Clark, 29 F. Supp. 13S (W.D. Mo. 1939) ; People v. Chat-
man, 322 Ill. App. 519, 54 N.E.2d 631 (1944). Cf. McQuaid v. United States, 193 F2d
987 (D.C. Cir. 1952); United States v. Heitner, 149 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1945).
63. See, e.g., cases cited notes 64-6 iqfra.
64. Bo=man Dairy v. United States, 341 U.S. 214 (1951) (antitrust) ; United States
v. Shubert, 11 F.R.D. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (same); Walling v. Richmond Screw Anchor
Co., 4 F.R.D. 265 (E.D.N.Y. 1943) (vage-hour).
65. Fleming v. Bernardi, 1 F.R.D. 624 (N.D. Ohio 1941). Cf. United States v.
Keown, 19 F. Supp. 639, 646 (W.D. Ky. 1937). This doctrine might also be applied in
criminal prosecutions.
66. The Sixth Amendment bars such a procedure in criminal cases, .M pra note 52.
This amendment is simply a codification of the hearsay rule which applies to c&vi as well
as criminal cases. Thus application of the hearsay rule in civil cases should produce a
result similar to that found in criminal cases.
67. See notes 48-9 smpra.
68. "[T]he accused must be apprised by the indictment, with reasonable certainty, of
the nature of the accusation against him, to the end that he may prepare his defence, and
plead the judgment as a bar to any subsequent prosecution for the same offense." United
States v. Simmons, 96 U.S. 360, 362 (1877). See HE.=., op. cit. muifra note 48, at 101.
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less its contents, as well as the informer's identity, are revealed to the defen-
dant.6 9
Protection in both criminal and civil cases may come also from the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Notions of due process place restrictions on
the government's discretion to withhold the contents of an informer's report.
It is the view of some courts that the government, by bringing an action, has
waived any privilege to suppress the contents of an informant's communica-
tion if the information is "importantly relevant" to a party's defense.70
Tort Actions Against Informers. While a party is generally protected from
unfair use of an informer's communication in the case which the informer
helped to build,71 he does not fare so well where he seeks redress against one
who informed falsely and maliciously. Often an informer's victim seeks redress
through an action for libel, slander, or malicious prosecution. In such suits
he will usually attempt to obtain disclosure of the informant's words, either
through discovery procedures 72 or by calling as a witness the informer or the
government official to whom he communicated.73 Lacking such information,
the plaintiff will ordinarily be unable to meet the respective requirements of
the law of defamation and of malicious prosecution that the exact words com-
plained of be produced,74 and that proof be made of the defendant's malice
69. Cf. United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950). Since the right of
notice and confrontation are normally accorded, few cases involving undisclosed evidence
arise. See FRANK, CASES ON CONSTITLMONAL LAW 587 n.6 (rev. ed. 1952). However, the
Supreme Court has alluded to the problem in a case involving state court proceedings. De
Jong v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937). Cf. Rex v. Justices of Bodman, [1947] 1 K.B.
321.
70. United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944), where Judge
Learned Hand put the Government to a choice: "either it must leave the transactions in
the obscurity from which a trial will draw them, or it must expose them fully." See also
United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1.946) ; United States v. Krulewitch, 145
F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Attorney General v. Tufts, 239 Mass. 458, 132 N.E. 322 (1921).
Contra: Arnstein v. United States, 296 Fed. 946 (D.C. Cir. 1924). See United States v.
Watkins, 67 F. Supp. 556, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). Cf. United States v. DeNormand, 149
F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1945) ; United States v. Ebeling, 146 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1944). However,
there is no waiver in a civil forum where the Government is the defendant. United States
v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1.953).
Some courts, in requiring disclosure of the contents of an informer's communication,
base their decision on reasons similar to those advanced when disclosure of the identity
of an informer is required. See Centoamore v. State, 105 Neb. 452, 181 N.W. 182 (1920)
(requiring disclosure of statements relating to the defendant's innocence) ; United States
v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Calif. 1952) (requiring disclosure of documents
essential to the defense).
71. See pp. 211-16 supra.
72. E.g., Schultz v. Strauss, 127 Wisc. 325, 106 N.W. 1066 (1906).
73. E.g., Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311 (1884) (defamation) ; Worthington v. Scrib-
ner, 109 Mass. 487 (1872) (malicious prosecution).
74. Foltz v. Moore McCormack Lines, 189 F.2d 537, 539 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 871 (1951) ("[Iln actions for libel or slander the false and defamatory matter should
be pleaded in haec verba .... "). Knowledge of the exact words may be necessary to prove
malice. Bunton v. Worley, 7 Ky. 38 (1815).
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and lack of probable cause in motivating prosecution.75 And both the informer
and, occasionally, the government vigorously oppose disclosure. 0 The courts
have been perversely receptive to their pleas, accepting their assertions of dis-
torted evidentiary privileges.
77
W~here courts have denied plaintiffs' requests for disclosure, they have
broadened the area in which protection from defamation suits has traditional-
ly been afforded. Communications to executive governmental officials con-
cerning the qualifications of subordinates are not privileged from rcvelation by
the substantive law of defamation;78 they are conditionally privileged from
being successfully used as the basis of a libel or slander action. " And the
usual rule is that reports of crime to law enforcement agents are also privi-
leged conditionally, rather than absolutely. 0 This qualified privilege evapo-
rates in the face of evidence that the defendant-informer's report vas false
and motivated by malice.8' But when judges accept the assertion of warped
evidentiary privileges to suppress the contents of an informer's report, the
communication is in effect afforded the absolute privilege denied by substan-
tive law. Without producing the defendant's words, the plaintiff has scant
hope of carrying his day in court .
2
75. E.g., Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187 (1878); Levy v. Brannan, 39 Cal. 4S5
(1870).
76. E.g., State v. Tune, 199 Mo. App. 404, 203 S.W. 465 (1918) (objection by govern-
ment) ; Marks v. Beyfus, 25 Q.B.D. 494 (IS90) (objection by government); Steen v.
First National Bank, 298 Fed. 36 (8th Cir. 1924) (objection by informer) ; State v. Wil-
cox, 90 Kan. 80, 132 Pac. 982 (1913) (objection by informer).
77. See notes 88, 92, 99 infra and accompanying text.
78. E.g., Blake v. Pilford, 1 M. & R. 198, 174 Eng. Rep. 67 (1832). Cf. Schultz v.
Strauss, 127 Wisc. 325, 329, 106 N.W. 1066, 1067 (1906).
79. E.g., White v. Nicholls, 3 How. 266 (U.S. 1845); Peinhardt v. West, 217 Ala.
12, 115 So. 88 (1927). See PaossEP, ToaTs 839 (1941). Cf. Note, 97 U. o. PA. L. Rv.
877 (1949).
80. E.g., Miller v. Nuckolls, 77 Ark. 64, 91 S.W. 759 (1905) ; Flanagan v. McLane,
87 Conn. 220, 87 At. 727 (1913) ; Eisenberg v. Reasenberg, 133 Misc. 190, 231 N.Y. Supp.
49 (Sup. Ct. 1928). Contra: Wells v. Toogood, 165 Mich. 677, 131 N.W. 124 (1911);
Johnson v. Evans, 3 Esp. 32, 170 Eng. Rep. 52S (1799). See Comments, 30 Tsx:,s L RE,.
875, 882 (1952), and 51 CoL L. REv. 244, 246 (1951); 27 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 170, 171 (1952);
65 HARv. L. REv. 358, 359 (1951).
However, where the la, requires that a report be submitted, an absolute privilege is
imposed on otherwise libelous matters. Stafney v. Standard Oil Co., 71 N.D. 170, 299
N.W. 582 (1941) (mandatory report to State Workmen's Compensation Bureau).
81. E.g., Briggs v. Byrd, 34 N.C. 377 (1851) ; Hathaway v. Bruggink, 163 Wisc. 390,
170 N.W. 244 (1919); Dickson v. Earl of Willon, 1 F. & F. 419, 175 Eng. Rep. 790
(1859). Cf. Note, 25 M~An. L. Rv. 136 (1941).
82. See notes 74-5 supra. See also 8 WVIGM0oE EvmzNcz § 2374 (3d ed. 1940) : "To
deny production [in an action against the informant for libel] is in effect to declare that
the libel is privileged from liability. If that is indeed the judicial belief and the law, it
should be frankly declared; if not, the action should not be defeated by an evasion which
pretends to keep secret that which is not secret." See also Comment, 22 CALIF. L REv. 667,
670 n.15 (1934).
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And the subject of an informer's spite is offered an empty alternative by
the law of malicious prosecution. In theory, this remedy is available to one
who has received a favorable verdict in a criminal or civil action inspired by
an informer who acted maliciously and without probable cause. 83 But a plain-
tiff is hard put to prove the last two elements of his cause where testimonial
privileges prevent him from introducing the informer's words in evidence.
8 4
However, expanded protection of informers from defamation and malicious
prosecution actions is unwarranted in both law and policy. The substantive
law provides absolute immunity to the honest informant." Thus utilization
of testimonial privileges in this context serves no higher function than the
absolute protection of the false and malicious informer.80 But the government
can have no valid interest in hearing untrue charges spitefully made.87 And
the courts commit error and create confusion when they supplement the sub-
stantive law by bending respectable evidentiary privileges to their purposes.
Some courts have extended the informer's privilege and the state secrets
privilege beyond their original scope to suppress the contents of an informant's
communication, even though his identity has already been revealed.88 But
the policy underlying the state secrets privilege generally is not applicable
to informers' reports.8 9 Although this privilege may properly be asserted
where revelation of informers' communications would threaten national securi-
ty or international relations, reports relating to ordinary law infractions do
83. E.g., Larocque v. Dorsey, 299 Fed. 556 (2d Cir. 1924) ; Glenn v. Lawrence, 280
Ill. 581, 117 N.E. 757 (1917).
84. See Bazzell v. Illinois Central R.R., 203 Ky. 626, 262 S.W. 966 (1.924).
85. See note 81 supra. The statements of various courts indicate that the substantive
law is not aimed at honest informants. Miller v. Nuckolls, 77 Ark. 64, 73, 91 S.W. 759,
762 (1905) (defamation-"It is doubtful if he was under any duty to voluntarily repeat
mere rumors of that kind affecting the character of an unmarried woman, even to an
officer of the law; and if he did so maliciously, an action would lie.") ; Kintz v. Harriger,
99 Ohio 240, 249, 124 N.E. 168, 171 (1919) (malicious prosecution-"I can conceive of no
good reason why the grand jury should be 'free and unobstructed' to the lawless, the con-
scienceless, and the utterly irresponsible citizen who seeks to work reprisals upon his
fellows.").
86. "The [testimonial] privilege thus has the effect of granting to the defendant an
immunity from responsibility regardless of the wanton nature of his act. It is conceivable
that in some cases gross injustices might occur." Comment, 22 CALIF. L. REy. 667, 670
n.15 (1934).
87. "Where information is obtainable on which to base suits against informers having
but a qualified privilege, there is, of course, some deterrent to their willingness to act with-
out reserve in the danger that some jury might find malice, contrary to the fact.... On
the other hand, it may be even more desirable to allow some restraint in order to reduce
the waste of requiring the F.B.I. to investigate and deal as best it can with false charges
maliciously made." Foltz v. Moore McCormack Lines, 189 F.2d 537, 540 (2d Cir. 1951), 27
N.Y.U.L. REV. 170 (1952).
88. See notes 29, 31 supra.
89. See notes 33, 35-7 sapra.
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not belong among the secrets of state. ° And an extension of the informer's
privilege which can serve only to shield the dishonest and the malicious from
tort actions is unwarranted.
9
1
The government occasionally invokes legislation protecting "official com-
munications" as a ground for judicial immunization of informers.92 A few
state legislatures, apparently attempting to codify the hazy common law state
secrets and informer's privileges, 9 3 have provided that reports to public offi-
cials shall, in the public interest, be privileged from revelation.54 The drafts-
men, probably inadvertently, used broad language. 5 Nevertheless, when the
statutory rule is employed as a state secrets privilege, considerations warrant-
ing its application should be no less weighty than those motivating the original
common law privilege.90 Thus in some instances these laws may justifiably
provide blanket protection to informers. But where they are too facilely ad-
ministered, tort plaintiffs are deprived of essential information without com-
pensating gains accruing to the state.97 The public interest which might or
might not "suffer by disclosure" should be carefully evaluated in each case,
that courts may avoid the unfair consequences likely to result from exclusion-
ary rules capriciously applied.95 And where the statutory rule is utilized as a
codification of the extended informer's privilege to embrace contents, its ap-
plication should be restricted to data not crucial to decision in defamation
and malicious prosecution suits.
Frequently judges have occasion to withhold informers' communications
upon assertion of the attorney-client privilege. 9 Consequently, a prosecuting
attorney or an FBI agent may be prevented from revealing what was told
him by an informer. 0 0 The attorney-client privilege, by encouraging full dis-
closure,1 1 is designed to enable lawyers to represent their clients effectively.10 2
90. E.g., Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 4S7 (1872) (report of a customs law vio-
lation). See Haydock, Some Ez-dentiary Problctns Poscd by Altomic Encrgy Sceurity
Requirenments, 61 HARv. L. Rzv. 463 (1948).
91. See, e.g., Krumin v. Bruknes, 255 Ill. App. 503 (1930) (malicious communication
of plaintiff's brother-in-law classified as state secret).
92. E.g., People v. King, 122 Cal. App. 50, 10 P.2d 89 (1932) ; State v. McClendon,
172 Minn. 106, 214 N.W. 782 (1927) ; State v. Hoben, 36 Utah 136, 102 Pac. 1000 (1959).
93. See State v. Hoben, supra note 92.
94. See note 40 supra.
95. See 8 VIGRoE, EviDENcE 786 (3d ed. 1940).
96. For situations in which the state secrets privilege may be invoked, see cases cited
in notes 35-7 supra.
97. Cf. People v. King, 122 Cal. App. 50, 10 P.2d S9 (1932); State v. McClendon, 172
Minn. 106, 215 N.W. 782 (1927) ; State v. Ayer, 122 Ore. 537, 259 Pac. 427 (197).
93. See Cole v. Andrews, 74 Minn. 93, 76 N.W. 962 (1393), where the court properly
refused to apply the privilege. See also 1 BL Comms. *139. Cf. Lindsey v. People, C5 Colo.
343, 181 Pac. 531 (1919).
99. See note 42 supra.
100. See respectively notes 44, 46 supra.
101. See note 43 supra.
102. "The necessary but fictitious assumption which charges everyone, in the conduct
of his own actions and affairs, with a knowledge of the law even more complete than in
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But the government official to whom an informer communicates is a repre-
sentative of the public; unlike the private attorney, he is not intended to
become the active protagonist of an individual's cause.10 3 His advice and effort
must be attuned to the public welfare and cannot be directed solely to pro-
tection of an informer's interests.10 4 The attorney-client privilege, as well as
other testimonial privileges, should not be dressed to double as an absolute
privilege from liability for defamation and malicious prosecution.
In the courtroom the public interest in facilitating use of informers is judi-
cially balanced against the demands of fair play for parties, except in the area
of tort redress. But all "trials" are not conducted in courts and all "rights"
are not adjusted by judges and juries; extra-judicial proceedings-the so-
called administrative process-play an increasingly important r6le in American
life.10 5 These procedures have been specifically designed to avoid courtroom
formality. 10 6 But in the streamlining process, fairness to the subjects of ad-
fact possessed by her ablest ministers, renders it equally necessary to an adequate adminis-
tration of justice that her officers appointed and accredited for that purpose, shall be avail-
able for confidential consultation in order that they may supply, to the extent of their learn-
ing and ability, the actual deficiency in a suitor's presumed knowledge of the law, as if they
were that suitor's other self. They would not be thus 'available' if the confidences reposed
in them might be betrayed either by them or by the agents of either confidentially em-
ployed to communicate such confidences." State v. Loponio, 88 At. 1045, 1047 (N.J. Ct.
Err. & App. 1913).
103. E.g., Cole v. Andrews, 74 Minn. 93, 76 N.W. 962 (1898) ; Centoamore v. State,
105 Neb. 452, 181 N.W. 182 (1920); Needham v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. 86, 233 S.W. 966
(1921). See also Granger v. Warrington, 8 Ill. 299, 309 (1846): "Granger can be con-
sidered in no other light than a witness on the part of the people, communicating to the
law officer of the Government, his knowledge in relation to the commission of a supposed
crime, and inquiring of that officer whether the facts thus communicated amounted to an
offence. We think that no considerations of public policy require that the conversation
between Granger and the State's Attorney should be regarded as confidential and privi-
leged. It would be an unnecessary extension of the rule in relation to confidential com-
munications and ought not, therefore, to be allowed."
104. "[The government official] was . . . a sworn minister of justice, whose duty it
was, while endeavoring to bring the guilty to punishment, to take care that the innocent
should be protected.... Communications made to him for the purpose of invoking official
action are supposed to be made for the purposes of public justice, and the party making
them can assume no control as to the use that shall be made of them subsequently." People
v. Davis, 52 Mich. 569, 573, 18 N.W. 362, 363 (1884).
105. For an excellent treatise on administrative law, see DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(1951). For additional material on the administrative process, its growth and significance, see
DICKINSON, ADMINIsTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW (1927) ; FREUND, Ar-
MINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY (1928); POUND, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW (1942); PUSEY, BIG GOVERNMENT (1945).
106. In his successful veto of the Walter-Logan bill in 1940, President Roosevelt com-
pared the judicial and administrative processes: "Court procedure is adapted to the inten-
sive investigation of individual controversies. But it is impossible to subject the daily
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ministrative action has often been slighted' 07-and never more markedly than
in agencies' use of informers.
THE INFORMER IN THE ADMINISTpAkTIVE PROCESS
In the administrative process, informers are utilized in a manner which
would never be sanctioned in courtroom proceedings. 0 s Some decisions are
based wholly on information withheld from the party 1c09 and even where the
contents of an informer's communication is openly introduced in evidence,
the informer's identity is often concealed.110 In the federal government's
employee security program, for example, "ironclad secrecy" surrounds the
routine of fact-finding in many of our agencies to court precedure. Litigation has become
costly beyond the ability of the average person to bear. Its technical rules of procedure
are often traps for the unwary and technical rules of evidence often prevent commc-n-sense
determinations on information which would be regarded as adequate f.r any business de-
cision. The increasing cost of competent legal advice and the necessity Qf relying upon law-
yers to conduct court proceedings have made all laymen and most lawyers recognize the
inappropriateness of entrusting routine processes of government to the outcome of never-
ending lawsuits.
"The administrative tribunal or agency has been evolved in order to handle controver-
sies arising under particular statutes. It is characteristic of these tribunals that simple
and nontechnical hearings take the place of court trials, and informal proceedings super-
sede rigid and formal pleadings and processes. A common-sense resort to usual and prac-
tical sources of information takes the place of archaic and technical applicativn of rules
of evidence. .. ." 86 CONG. REc. 13942 (1940).
107. See Justice Jackson's dissenting statement in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194, 217 (1947) : "I have long urged, and still believe, that the administrative prucess de-
serves fostering in our system as an expeditious and non-technical method of apIlyingj lawe
in specialized fields. I can not agree that it be used, and I think its continued effectiveness
is endangered when it is used, as a method of dispensing ith lazo in those fields:'
108. See Judge Edgerton's dissenting opinion in Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F2d 46, 65
(D.C. Cir. 1950): "Without trial by jury, without evidence, and without even being
allowed to confront her accusers or to know their identity, a citizen of the United States
has been found disloyal to the government of the United States." See also O'Brian,
Loyalty Tests and Guilt by Association, 61 H. Av. L REv. 592, 609 (1943).
One of the most blatant attempts to avoid courtroom procedures is seen in the Emer-
gency Detention Act of 1950. The Act provides that upon the declaration of an "Internal
Security Emergency" by the president, the Government may apprehend "each person as
to whom there is reasonable ground to believe that such person probably will engage in,
or probably will conspire with others to engage in, acts of espionage or of sabotage." At
the hearing of those detained, the "Attorney General or his representative shall not be
required to furnish information the revelation of which would disclose the identity or
evidence of Government agents or officers which he believes it would be dangerous to
national safety and security to divulge." 64 STAT. 1019 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 814(d) (Supp.
1952).
There are also opportunities to utilize informers in non-government areas. See Com-
ment, Loyalty and Private Employment: The Right of Employers to Discharge Stuspectcd
Sakbersives, 62 Y.LE L.J. 954 (1953).
109. See note 132 infra. Cf. Van Knorr v. Miles, 60 F. Supp. 962 (D. Mass. 1945).
110. E.g., Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454 (1919).
1953]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
names of informants"'-and some of the agencies probably render adverse
determinations of "loyalty" on the basis of informers' evidence never dis-
closed to the parties.
1 1 2
The reports of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, containing the com-
munications of informers, furnish the principal source of confidential infor-
mation in the administrative process.11 3 These reports are kept secret on the
theory that disclosure would seriously endanger national security and elimi-
nate the Bureau's effectiveness." 4 But administrative agencies prescribe no
standard size for the cloak of secrecy veiling FBI reports. In some cases the
contents are revealed only to the deciding body ;115 in others, they are dis-
closed in varying degrees of specificity to the parties."0 But in most cases
the identity of the informer and the person to whom he communicated re-
mains unknown to both the deciding body and the parties before it." 7 General-
ly a report states that information was received from "T-1, a person of known
reliability," and the recipient of the information is not named. 118 Thus the
contents of an informer's communication may form the basis of an adminis-
trative decision even though the deciding body is unaware of the identity of
both the informant and his governmental "contact."" 9 By extending the role
of informers, the administrative process has placed greater emphasis on speedy
procedures than upon fair play.
1.11. See BONTECOU, THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SEcURITY PROGRAM 61 (1953). On April
27, 1953, President Eisenhower abolished the Loyalty Program and substituted a Security
Program, N.Y. Times, April 28, 1953, p. 20, col. 2. However, "under the new system-
as under the old-[employees] might be dismissed on the basis of a case initiated after
accusations from anonymous accusers." Id. col. 5. The new Security Program has been
criticized by the American Civil Liberties Union as failing "to provide cross-examination
... a right which is basic to a fair hearing." A.C.L.U. WEEKLY BULL #1601 (July 6,
1953).
112. BONTECOU, op. cit. supra note 111, at 63. For a discussion of the use of confidential
information in the Port Security Program, see Brown & Fassett, Security Tests for Mari-
time Workers: Die Process under the Port Security Program, 62 YALE L.J. 1163, 1177-82
(1.953).
113. See Hoover, Civil Liberties and Law Enforcement: The Role of the F.BJ., 37
IowA L. REv. 175 (1952) ; Hoover, Civil Investigation of the F.B.1., 1 SYRACuSE L. REV.
380 (1950) ; Hearings, supra note 15, at 328; 51 CoL L. REv. 244, 245 (1951).
114. Hearings, supra note 15, at 328. See also note 16 supra.
115. See Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). See also KNAuFr, THE ELLEN
KNAUFF STORY (1952).
116. See BONTEcOU, op. cit. mpra note 111.
117. See Richardson, The Federal Employee Loyalty Program, 51 CoL L. REv. 546,
549 (1951). See also Bontecou, op. cit. mpra note 111. And in Brief for Appellant, p. 17,
Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950) it is pointed out that the name of the
person to whom the informer reported-the FBI agent-is unknown.
118. See Emerson and Helfeld, Loyalty Anong Government Employees, 58 YALE L.J.
1, 103 (1948) ; O'Brian, New Encroachments on Individual Freedom, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1,
19 (1952). Cf. LAsswELL, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL Faeaoa 209 n.9 (1950).
119. See notes 117, 118 supra.
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Facilitating the Use of Informers
Where appellate courts have approved this deviation from the balance
ordinarily maintained in courtroom proceedings, they have attempted to
rationalize their decisions by drawing nice distinctions between "rule-making"
and "adjudicatory" proceedings, between "rights" and "privileges," and by
denominating administrative proceedings "non-criminal." The place of in-
formers has been expanded in those administrative proceedings which courts
label "legislative" or "rule-making" rather than "judicial," -quasi-judicial,"
or "adjudicatory."'120  The former supposedly look to the future and prescribe
general rules of conduct for broadly identified situations,'-" while the latter
are immediately applicable to individuals in their individual capacities. 1
When an administrative proceeding fits into the "legislative" or "rule-making"
category, confidential reports may form the basis of the deciding body's deter-
mination.123 Courts also sanction an extended r6le for informers in adminis-
trative proceedings which involve "privileges" rather than "rights." 12 4 A
120. Prior to the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 STAT. 237 (1946),
as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (Supp. 1952), courts distinguished between "legisla-
tive" and "judicial" or "quasi-judicial" proceedings. See, e.g., Prentis v. Atlantic Coast
Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908). The APA classifies administrative actions as "rule-mah-
ing" and "adjudication." The relationship between these two sets of labels is clear. See
.Am iismAnlvE PROCEDURE Acr-LEGI sLA'rlx HiSTORY, Ss . Doe. No. 243, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1946). In general, "we speak of rule or rule-making whenever agencies are exer-
cising legislative powers. We speak of order and adjudication when they are doing things
which courts otherwise do." Id. at 355. See also Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174
F.2d 676, 692 (9th Cir. 1949) : "The Administrative Procedure Act is based upon a broad
and logical dichotomy between 'rule-making' and 'adjudication, i.e., legislative and judicial
functions."
121. For a discussion of the various possible definitions of these terms, see DAvis, op.
cit. supra note 105, at 184 (1951). See also Fuchs, Procedure in Admyniistratij'. Rute-M.1ah-
ing, 52 HARv. L. REv. 259, 265 (1938) ; Green, Separation of GoIen:wvtal Pia'ers, 29
YALE LJ. 369,373 (1920).
122. See DlczIcso., op. cit. supra note 105, at 21; Green, supra note 121.
123. Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 22S U.S. 294 (1933).
In the pre-APA era, courts "imposed much less onerous procedural requirements in
cases which concerned the exercise of functions which are legislative in nature." Schwartz,
Administrative Terminwlogy and the Administrative Proecdure Act, 43 Alcn. L Ra,. 57,
66 (1949). See Netterville, Te Administrative Proccdvre Act: 4 Study in Interpretation,
20 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 1, 11 (1951). Thus, actions could be taken without requiring an
opportunity for a hearing. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Nebraska, 170 U.S. 57 (1893). How-
ever, the APA prescribes situations in which parties affected by administrative rule-mak-
ing must be given notice of and a chance to participate in the proceeding. A distinction is
made between "formal" and "informal" rule-making, with the former usually requiring a
hearing and the procedural protection prescribed by the Act. See Comment, 56 YA=- LJ.
670, 675-6 (1947). But the benefits accorded by the APA are not grounded in the due
process clause. They are accorded where "rules are required by statute to be made on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing." A m1ImISTRATViE PW cmuE A r § 4(b)
(emphasis supplied).
124. E.g., Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 33S U.S. 537 (1949).
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government job,125 a passport,120 a license, 127 a parole,128 use of the mails, 120
and a conscientious objector Selective Service classification 180 have all at
times been deemed "privileges." As such, the manner of their granting or
denial has been held free of constitutional restraint. 18 1 Consequently, "privi-
leges" have been denied solely on the basis of information never revealed to
the party involved. 3 2 And courts justify expanded use of informers on the
theory that administrative proceedings are not criminal actions and therefore
are not governed by the Sixth Amendment. 133 In reaching this conclusion,
125. E.g., Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99 (1890) ; Bailey v. Richardson, 182
F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950). See Powell, The Right to Work for the State, 16 CoL. L. REV. 99
(1916) ; Notes, 60 HARv. L. REV. 779 (1947) ; 6 RuTERs L. REV. 451 (1952). Cf. UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS Art. 21.
126. While no court has specifically classified the receipt of a passport as a "privilege"
and not a "right," it has been suggested that this is the theory upon which passports have
been granted or denied. See Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 171, 187 (1952) ; "Passport Denied",
3 STAN. L. REV. 312,316 (1951).
127. E.g., State Board of Equalization v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. App. 2d 374, 42 P.2d
1076 (1935) ; Nutler v. State Road Commission, 119 W. Va. 312, 193 S.E. 549 (1937). See
also Tuttrup, Necessity of Notice and Hearing in the Revocation of Occupational Licenses,
4Wis. L. REv. 180 (1927).
128. See, e.g., Wright v. Herzog, 182 Md. 316, 34 A.2d 460 (1943) ; Guy v. Utecht, 216
Minn. 255, 12 N.W.2d 753 (1943) ; People v. Oskroba, 305 N.Y. 113, 111 N.E.2d 235 (1953).
Contra: Fleenor v. Hammond, 116 F.2d 982 (6th Cir. 1941) ; Brill v. State, 159 Fla. 682,
32 So.2d 607 (1947). See also Weihofen, Revoking Probation, Parole or Pardon Without
a Hearing, 32 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 531 (1942).
129. Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921). But cf. Hannegan
v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1,946) where the Supreme Court cited Justice Brandeis' dissent
in the Burleson case and said: "But grave constitutional questions are immediately raised
once it is said that the use of the mails is a privilege which may be extended or withheld on
any grounds whatever." Id. at 156. And cf. Pike v. Walker, 121 F.2d 37, 39 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 625 (1941), 50 YALE L.J. 1479.
130. See, e.g.. United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931) ; Imboden v. United
States, 194 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1952). Cf. United States v. Cain, 149 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1945);
De Graw v. Toon, 151 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1945).
131. Courts have developed the habit of justifying a refusal to safeguard a "privilege"
by mechanically quoting the well-known aphorism of Justice Holmes: "The petitioner may
have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a police-
man." McAuliffe v. Mayor and Board of Aldermen of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29
N.E. 517 (1892). Rarely is an attempt made to determine whether conditions have changed
since Justice Holmes dealt with the "rights" of New Bedford policeman.
132. Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950). See also Knauff v. Shaugh-
nessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). See Gardner, Bailey v. Richardson and the Constitution of the
United States, 33 B.U.L. REV. 176 (1953).
The Knaztff case involved the application of a wartime measure, 55 STAT. 252 (1941),
22 U.S.C. § 223 (1946). However, in 1950 Congress provided that the attorney-general
could exclude aliens "on the basis of information of a confidential nature, the disclosure of
which would be-prejudicial to the public interest, safety, or security. . . ." 64 STAT. 1006
(1950), 8 U.S.C. § 137-4 (Supp. 1952).
133. Imboden v. United States, 194 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1952) ; Bailey v. Richardson,
182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950). Cf. United States v. Nugent, 200 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1952).
[Vol. 63:206
AN INFORMER'S TALE
courts rely on the fact that neither the proceedings nor the sanctions imposed
are labeled "criminal,"' 134 nor do administrative bodies in fact follow proce-
dures peculiar to criminal trials.130
Assuring Fair Play to Parties
The subject of an administrative determination, unlike the defendant in a
courtroom, derives minimal protection from federal and state constitutions.
Due process of law applies only where "rights" are adjudicated.1301 Here the
party, involved is afforded an opportunity to meet the case against him; he
must receive a full hearing. 137 This requirement protects a party from an ad-
ministrative decision based on evidence known only to the deciding body. 38
However, the hearing guarantee has not necessitated fixed procedural rules ;-.3
See Fraenkel, Can the Administrative Process Evade the Sixth Amendwct?, 1 Synrcuss
L. REv. 173 (1949).
134. E.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 693 (1S93) (a deportation order
is not punishment for crime but a way of enforcing the return to a country by an alien who
has not complied with proper procedures); Washington v. Clark, 84 F. Supp. 964, 967
(D.D.C. 1949) (since employer-employee relations are involved, "An employer does not
have to grant to his employee a formal trial, with all its pomp and circumstance, before
discharging the employee."). Cf. Board of Trade v. Wallace, 67 F-d 407 (7th Cir. 1933).
135. See, e.g., Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952): "Deportation is not a
criminal proceeding and has never been held to be punishment. No jury sits. No judicial
review is guaranteed by the Constitution." Cf. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 400 n.3
(1938).
136. "Due process of law is not applicable unless one is being deprived of something
to which he has a right." Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 5S (D.C. Cir. 1950).
It follows that when a "right" is involved, the proceeding is labeled "adjudicatory" or
"judicial." And due process is applicable to "judicial," "quasi-judicial," or "adjudicatory"
proceedings. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (193S); Washington v. Clark, 34 F.
Supp. 964 (D.D.C. 1949). But while the procedural requirements of the APA, §§ 7-3,
are applicable only to adjudications "required by statute to be determined on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing," AnDma'rixTRTiv Pn.cEDuRE Acr § 5, the Supreme
Court has prescribed similar procedures for adjudications required by the Constitution to he
determined after a hearing. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
However, Congress may prescribe fair procedures for proceedings involving "privi-
leges." An attempt in this directon is found in the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, 37 STAT. 555
(1912), 5 U.S.C. § 652 (1946), prescribing the manner in which members of the classified
Civil Service may be removed.
137. E.g., ICC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 227 U.S. SS (1913). See also The Japa-
nese Immigrant Case, 139 U.S. 86 (1903).
138. ICC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 93 (1913) ("iT]here is no hear-
ing when the party does not kmow what evidence is offered or considered and is not given
an opportunity to test, explain, or refute."). See also Moran v. School Commission of
Littleton, 317 Mass. 591, 594, 59 N.E.2d 279, 281 (1945) ("A decision made in a quasi-judi-
cial proceeding by an administrative board based on evidence known only to members of the
board is a nullity.") ; Thomas J. Meunier's Case, 319 Mass. 421, 66 N.E.2d 193 (1946);
Berizzi Co. v. Krausz, 239 N.Y. 315, 146 N.E. 436 (1925). Cf. United States v. Abilene &
Southern R.R., 265 U.S. 274 (1924).
139. See Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 19 (1938) : "Congress, in requiring a
'full hearing,' had regard to judicial standards,--not in any technical sense but with respect
1953]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
usually there must be notice of charges,140 a chance to reply,' 41 and a reasoned
decision,1 42 but conformity to the evidentiary rules peculiar to trials is not
required. 43 Consequently, even where "rights" are involved hearsay is freely
admissible-determinations need be only in accordance with "reliable, pro-
bative and substantial evidence.'
44
Parties to an administrative proceeding may, however, be protected from
unfair use of hearsay evidence; not all courts agree on whether an adminis-
trative decision based entirely on hearsay is valid.14 5 And even courts permit-
ting such a decision insist that the hearsay be of the kind "on which respon-
sible persons are accustomed to rely in serious affairs.' 40 Accordingly, even
where the liberal policy toward admitting hearsay is held to permit receipt
of reports from unidentified informers, this information cannot form the sole
basis of a determination. The widespread condemnation of informers indi-
cates that theirs is not the sort of information upon which responsible persons
rely.147 An informant may be "a paragon of veracity, a knave, or the village
idiot.' 48 And where the source of intelligence is known but concealed, sus-
picion substitutes for certainty.
Moreover, parties before an administrative tribunal are usually permitted
to "conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true
to those fundamental requirements of fairness which are of the essence of due process in a
proceeding of a judicial nature." See also Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in
the Administrative Process, 55 HARv. L. REv. 364 (1942).
140. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938). See also Hurwitz v. North, 271
U.S. 40 (1926); Deak v. Pace, 185 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1950). Cf. Kwong Hal Chew
v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) ; Carstens v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 572, 158 Pac. 218 (1916).
141. See note 140 supra. See also Bereda Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Board, 275 Ill. 514,
114 N.E. 275 (1916).
142. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943) ("[T]he orderly functioning of the
process of review -requires that the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted be
clearly disclosed and adequately sustained."). See also ADMINISTRATE PRocEDURE Acr
§ 8(b).
143. Opp Cotton Mills v. Adm'n, 312 U.S. 126,155 (1941). See also Comment, 24 CoaN.
L.Q. 583 (1939).
144. ADmNISTRATIVE PRocEDuRE Acr § 7(c).
145. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1.945); Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 230 (1938) ; NLRB v. Bell Oil & Gas Co., 98 F.2d 406, 409 (5th Cir.
1938). The majority of appellate opinons seems to frown upon decisions based entirely on
hearsay. See cases collected in Davis, op. cit. supra note 105, at § 145.
146. NLRB v. Remington Rand, 94 F.2d 862, 873 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 576
(1938). But one court has held that "responsible persons are not accustomed to rely on hear-
say in serious affairs." Tyne Co. v. NLRB, 125 F.2d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 1942).
147. "The talebearer shall defile his own soul, and be hated by all." Ecclesiasticus, xxi,
31, See also District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 630 (1937) ; Colyer v. Skeffing-
ton, 265 Fed. 17, 69 (D. Mass. 1920), rev'd, 277 Fed. 129 (1st Cir. 1921) ; Bradley v. McIn-
tosh, 5 Ont. Rep. 227 (1884). See statement of Edward Livingston opposing the Alien Bill,
quoted in BOWERS, JEFFMSON AND HAmLTON 378 (1925).




disclosure of the facts."'149 Some appellate courts have limited the role of
informers in administrative proceedings by finding an improper denial of cross-
examination. Thus where the report of an informer was admitted in evidence
but his identity withheld, courts have found that the denial of opportunity to
cross-examine was prejudicial error.15 And although courts sanction such a
procedure where it is clear that the informer's communication in no way in-
fluenced the decision,' 5' they reverse where the communication played some
part in inspiring a determination.15
2
Where "mere privileges" are being determined, subjects of administrative
action are farther removed from constitutional protection.15r In fact, the
Supreme Court has said that judicial review follows only upon the denial
of a "right."' 54 Until 1952, parties to administrative "privilege" determina-
tions had only hope, based on dicta. 155 However, in lWicwan v. Updcgraff 150
the Supreme Court, testing a state loyalty oath program, stated that "con-
stitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pur-
suant to statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory."'517 Justice Clark,
for the majority, did not find it necessary first to determine whether one has
an "abstract right" to public employment., s Citizens may find some cheer
in this decision; denying a "privilege" on the basis of secret information would
seem "patently arbitrary."
But parties to administrative proceedings will not be adequately protected
from unfair use of informers' communications so long as many appellate courts
149. A ms AstlTrin Paocrzutr AcT § 7(c). See D.%vIs, op. cit. sutra note 105, at 469.
See also Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, 175 F.2d S00, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1948); L B. Wilson V.
FCC, 170 F.2d 793, 805 (D.C. Cir. 1948). Cf. Segal Lock & Hardware Co. v. FTC, 143
F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1944).
150. Powhatan Mining Co. v. Ickes, 118 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1941). Cf. Simpkins v. State
Banking Dept., 45 Ariz. 186,42 P.2d 47 (1935).
151. Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454 (1920).
152. Chew Hoy Quong v. White, 249 Fed. 869, 870 (9th Cir. 1918) ("[There clearly
is no warrant for basing a decision, in whole or in part, on confidential communications.").
Cf. United States v. Reimer, 103 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1939) ; United States v. Dunton, 291 Fed.
905 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
153. See notes 124, 131-2 supra.
154. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940); Dorsheimer v. United States,
74 U.S. 166 (1868).
155. "The Constitution does not guarantee public employment. ... But it does not at
all follow that because the Constitution does not guarantee a right to public employment,
a city or State may resort to any scheme for keeping people out of such employmAentL...
[D]oubtless unreasonable discriminations, if avowed in formal law, would not survive con-
stitutional challenge." Garner v. Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716, 725 (1950) (concurring
opinion). See also United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947) ; People v.
Crane, 214 N.Y. 154,168, 108 N.E. 427,431 (1915).
156. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
157. Id. at 192. But cf. United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1 (1953). For a discussion
of the meaning and significance of the INugent case, see Brown & Fassett, .uspra note 112,
at 1194-6.
158. Wiemanv. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952).
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meet them with rubrics and abstract distinctions. No mechanical test has yet
been devised to distinguish "rights" from "privileges." 1 o Where deprivation
of a "privilege" inflicts consequences as serious as those entailed by depriva-
tion of a "right," variant procedures are unwarranted. 16 ° Especially is this so
where denial of a "privilege" invades First Amendment guarantees, which
supposedly occupy a preferred position in our constitutional framework. 101
While a presumption of constitutionality attaches to economic regulations,
those affecting First Amendment "rights" of free speech, religion, and press
are afforded no such presumption or are presumed invalid.102 When the
denial of a "privilege" impinges upon such "rights," as where loyalty pro-
ceedings throttle free speech,163 the "privilege" might well be entitled to
exalted protection.
64
The artificial "right-privilege" dichotomy should not control administrative
procedures; that procedure which produces a "fair," "equitable," or "just"
result should determine the label. Such a result is not achieved when a person
is deprived of a valuable "right" or "privilege" on the basis of information
known only to his judges.'6 5
159. See Note, 6 RuTGERs L. REv. 451,459 (1952).
Attempts to distinguish between "rights" and "privileges" have been made. See Hou-
I_.D, FUNDAmENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS CC. 1-2 (1923).; RESTATEMENT, PRoPErTY §§ 1-2
(1936) ; Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L.J. 163 (1919). But these
attempts have been severely criticized. See MCDOUGAL & HADER, PROPERTY, WAuLTII,
LAND: ALLOCATION, PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT 28 (1948). For a suggested approach
to classification, see Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Profes-
sional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 237-43 (1943).
160. See Irvine v. State Board of Equalization, 40 Cal. App. 2d 280, 104 P.2d 847
(1940). See Davis, The Requirement of Opportunity to be Heard it; the Administralive
Process, 51 YALE L.J. 1093, 1.123 (1942) ; Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 171, 190 (1952).
161. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77,82 (1948).
162. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). This prin-
ciple has subsequently been reaffirmed. E.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1944)
("[T]he usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the preferred place given
in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First
Amendment... That priority gives these liberties a sanctity and a sanction not permitting
dubious intrusions.").
163. See Judge Edgerton's dissenting opinion in Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 66
(D.C. Cir. 1950). See Jahoda & Cook, Security Measures and Freedom of Thought: Af
Exploratory Study of the Impact of Loyalty and Security Programs, 61 YALE L.J. 295
(1952) ; Comment, 36 CALIF. L. REV. 596, 600 (1948).
164. Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (dissenting opinion). See
also Emerson & Helfeld, supra note 118, at 83.
Other legal theories have been utilized to safeguard "privileges." Thus it has been held
that a state may not grant a "privilege" under conditions requiring the relinquishment of
constitutional rights. Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 577 (1925) ;
Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. App. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946). See
Hale, Unconstitutiontal Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COL. L. REv. 321 (1935)
Comment, 39 ILL. L. REv. 246 (1945).
165. See Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Com-
mittee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951) : "The heart of the matter is that democracy
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Similarly, distinctions between "rule-making" and "adjudicatory" proceed-
ings are often illusory.' 0 Attempting clearly to define each type of proceed-
mng, no matter how precisely, will not assure uniformly fair deisions.'7 Fre-
quently situations arise which do not slide comfortably into either slot. An
administrative decision may be general in character and apply to the future
but may also directly affect the rights of a particular individual. 0 s And every
"adjudication" of an individual's rights interprets and declares the lawv, thus
affecting the future conduct of others.' c9 Rubrics are blind to particular
justice.
Finally, classification of all administrative determinations as "non-criminal"
winks at the gravity of their consequences. Courts label administrative actions
non-criminal because they employ non-criminal procedures.L" But the pro-
cedures prescribed for a particular action are not conclusive of its character.
Rather, procedures should follow the nature of the sanction imposed.171 A
"criminal" sanction characteristically works deprivation of life, liberty, or
property and visits stigma upon the convicted.' 72 Where the severity of an
administrative sanction is as great, only a devotion to labels can justify a
deviation from Sixth Amendment safeguards.' 7 3
implies respect for the elementary rights of men, however suspect or unworthy; a demo-
cratic government must therefore practice fairness, and fairness can rarely be obtained by
secret, one-sided determinations .. " See also Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 551
(1.950) (dissenting opinion).
166. See Davis, op. cit. supra note 105, § 54; Parker, The Administrative Proccdtre
Act: A Study in Overestination, 60 Y'., L.J. 581, 595 (1951).
167. Davis, op. cit. supra note 105, at 190; Netterville, supra note 123, at 20; Hankins,
Tih Necessity for Administrat fve Notice and Hcaring, 25 IowA L REv. 457, 463 (1940).
168. See Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, 175 F2d SOS (D.C. Cir. 1948), where the court iound
that an SEC "rule" so greatly affected the plaintiff's individual rights that classification as
adjudication vms more accurate and fair.
169. Thus an NLRB decision that certain acts constitute unfair labor practices may
prompt an employer or union to change policies presently pursued.
170. See note 135 supra.
171. See Dession, Social Sanctions, 1 VA. L. WInFxLy Dicr, CA uArTo: , 25
(1949) ; Dession, Sanctions, Law and Public Order, 1 VA qD. I Rv. 8 (1947).
172. "The distinguishing attribute of the criminal sanction is that whatever other de-
privation may be involved (usually liberty and not infrequently property) it also carries a
moral stigma. The convict is deprived of respect." Dession, Justice After Comict ioj, 25
CoNN. BAR J. 215,217 (1951).
173. Courts have frequently recognized the severity of administrative sanctions. They
have observed that deportation may result in the loss of "all that makes life worth living."
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). The denial of a passport has been viewed
as having "a very direct bearing on the applicant's personal liberty to travel outside of the
United States," Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445, 451 (D.D.C. 1952), especially where
her livelihood depended on such travel. In considering what procedures were applicable
where a municipal employee was disciplined, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that it
made no difference that a disciplinary, rather than a criminal, action was involved. Fusco
v. Moses, 304 N.Y. 424, 107 N.E.2d 581 (1952). And proscription from any opportunity
to serve the government has been called "punishment, and of the most severe type.' United
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RECOMMENDATIONS AND 'CONCLUSION
Appellate courts generally strike a balance between courtroom protection
to informers and fair play to parties. Only by allowing perverted testimonial
privileges to frustrate the substantive law of defamation and malicious prose-
cution has the judiciary loaded the scales in favor of informants.17 4 In the
administrative process, however, expediency has frequently replaced fairness.
Informers' communications are not only used as leads to law violation and
misconduct, but also are received as probative evidence. 170 A party may never
know the basis of the administrative tribunal's decision, and the tribunal may
not know the source of the reports which guide its determinations. 17
The administrative process should not provide an opportunity for sidestep-
ping procedural safeguards of individual freedom. Whether or not a particular
utilization of informers is constitutional should not be the decisive test; often
what escapes constitutional interdiction is nevertheless unwise or unfair.
177
And it is not too much to ask that administrative procedures be geared to
fairness. This does not mean, however, that the government's needs must
now be ignored; there is room for compromise in the search for equity. Thus
in some circumstances an informer's evidence may properly be employed in
an administrative determination without his identity being revealed to the
party. 78 Such a circumstance may arise where the informant, be he an FBI
operative or a person in contact with the Bureau, is engaged in counter-
espionage. Perhaps here the administrative body should be permitted to con-
sider an affidavit from the Director of the FBI which explains the situation,
sets forth the informant's evidence, and requests that the informant's identity
not be made public. If the administrative tribunal chooses to grant the re-
quest, it should nevertheless be told the identity of the informer and be allowed
States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316 (1946). The exclusion of an individual from a police
force on loyalty grounds "may well ruin his future" and cause him to "suffer... blight and
humiliation." Hamilton v. Brennan, 203 Misc. 536, 543, 119 N.Y.S.2d 83, 89 (Sup. Ct.
1953). And the Supreme Court has also noted the consequences of being labeled "disloyal."
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952).
174. See text at pp. 216-20 supra.
175. See notes 109-110 supra.
176. See note 117 supra.
177. "Civil liberties draw at best only limited strength from legal guaranties, Pre-
occupation by our people with the constitutionality, instead of with the wisdom, of legislation
or of executive action is preoccupation with a false value .... Focusing attention on consti-
tutionality tends to make constitutionality synonymous with wisdom." Frankfurter, J., con-
curring in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 555 (1951). See also BIDDLE, THE FAR
OF FREEDom 212 (1952); Chafee, Thirty-Five Years with Freedom of Speech, 1 KAN. L.
Rzv. 1, 27 (1952) ; Durr, The Loyalty Order's Challenge to the Constitution, 16 U. or Cm.
L. RE V. 298, 305 (1949).
178. The recommendations following in the text apply only to those administrative pro-




to cross-examine him at an in camera session.l70 The general nature of the
informer's testimony should be revealed to the party involved,1 6s and the
party should be permitted to supplement the agency's examination with writ-
ten interrogatories. However, if the agency perceives that its decision will
necessarily rest solely on the informant's testimony, his identity should be
disclosed to the party or the proceeding should be dropped. Where the in-
former is not a counter-espionage agent, the government should either present
the informer, forego use of his evidence, locate evidence which it feels free
to submit unconditionally, or abandon the case.15s
But perhaps the pressing need for adjustment in the use of informers should
prompt a general reconsideration of their place in a democratic societ3
,y' --
a society whose peculiar wisdom has been its respect for the individual.L'
The informer has not been an honored member of the community; 2s  pro-
tecting him by depriving a party of fair play frequently means that slight
risks to national security have been avoided by permitting very great risks
to individual rights.'85 Yet "every adherence to our moral professions re-
inforces our strength and therefore our security."'8 0 The value of informers
should be compared with the harms attending their utilization, to the end that
179. Cf. Shaughnessy v. United States ex re. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 228 n.9 (1953).
180. Cf. Donovan & Jones, Program For a Dcnwcratic Counter Attach to Comnunist
Penetration of Government Serice, 58 YALE L.J. 1211, 1235 (1949) ; Note, 47 CoL L Rwv.
1161, 1176 (1947).
181. Cf. Brown & Fassett, supra note 112, at 1201-3.
182. "The use of statements by informers who need not confront the person under in-
vestigation or accusation has such an infamous history that it shuld be roted out frum
our procedure. A hearing at which these faceless people are allowed to present their whis-
pered rumors and yet escape the test and torture of cross-e.xaminat, n is not a hearing in the
Anglo-American sense. We should be done with the practice-whether the life of a man is
at stake, or his reputation, or any matter touching upon his status or his rights. If FBI
reports are disclosed in administrative or judicial proceedings, it may be that valuable under-
ground sources will dry up. But that is not the choice. If the aim is to protect the under-
ground of informers, the FBI report need not be used. If it is used, then fairness requires
that the names of the accusers be disclosed. Without the identity of the informer the rrson
investigated or accused stands helpless. The prejudices, the credibility, the passions, the
perjury of the informer are never known. If they were exposed, the whole charge might
wither under the cross-examination." Douglas, J., dissenting in United States v. Nugent,
346 U.S. 1, 13 (1953). See also O'Reilly, Discovery Against the United States: A Ncw
Aspect of Sovereign Immunity, 21 N.C.L. REv. 1, 14 (1942).
183. BARm, THE LOYALTY OF FREE MEx 3 (1951) ; Douglas, A Crusade for te Bar:
Due Process in a Timwe of World Conflict, 39 A.B.A.J. 871, 875 (1953).
184. See note 147 supra.
185. Carr, National Security and Individual Freedom, 42 YALE REv. 496, 497 (1953);
"Lcz-wyer Schools" or "Policy Scincne"?: Yale Law Faculty's Manifesto Stirs Debate, 34
A.B.A.J. 15 (1948). But cf. Hoover, A Comment on the Article "Loyalty An: g Govcrn-
inent Employees, 58 YALE L.J. 401,409 (1949).
186. Frankfurter, J., dissenting in United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1, 13 (1953).
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their true worth may be assessed. 187 In this endeavor the words of Judge
Learned Hand must figure: "Risk for risk, for myself I had rather take my
chance that some traitors will escape detection than spread abroad a general
suspicion and distrust, which accepts rumor and gossip in place of undis-
mayed and unintimidated inquiry. I believe that that community is already
in process of dissolution where each man begins to eye his neighbor as a pos-
sible enemy .... ",188
187. Note that assurance of anonymity may not be the only effective device for en-
couraging communications to the government. The policy of affording protection to in-
formers developed side by side with a conflicting policy: qui tarn actions gave the informer
an opportunity to reap a reward for his sleuthing. Donnelly, Judicial Control of Infornants,
Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agents Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091 (1951). This action was
first permitted under the customs law but is now also granted in many other fields. Ibid.
For a discussion of informer suits see United States v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943). Accord-
ingly, persons who detect violations of these laws are allowed to bring a suit and recover part
of the penalty imposed by law. Thus informers can currently choose between two courses
of action: to the bold, notoriety and financial gain are assured; to the timid, anonymity is
proff erred.
188. Address by Judge Learned Hand at the 86th Convocation of the University of the
State of New York, Oct. 24, 1952, at Albany, New York.
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